The FAA is probing a Boeing 737 Max software glitch that can cut automated guidance during aborted landings, and airlines are refusing some new jets over it.
The Federal Aviation Administration is investigating a software flaw in some Boeing 737 Max jets that can knock out automated vertical navigation during a missed approach, leaving pilots to handle more of the airplane by hand at low altitude near the airport.
CBS News reported that the problem can appear in a rare go-around scenario when the autopilot is on, the crew is flying a precision approach, and a pilot switches back to a pre-programmed flight plan. The flight management computer can then drop VNAV, the automated path that manages climb and descent, and hand the job to a simpler pitch mode. The autopilot keeps working. Pilots still have to take extra steps at a moment when the cockpit is already busy.
Boeing told operators the glitch is not an immediate safety issue. Several major airlines are not waiting for that assurance alone. Southwest and United have told the company they will not take new aircraft loaded with the affected operating system and want the prior version instead.
Southwest Airlines, United Airlines, Alaska Airlines, and American Airlines all told CBS that none of their in-service 737 Max fleets run the software versions tied to the problem. Southwest and United went further: no new deliveries with that operating system.
Southwest is due to begin receiving Max 7 jets this fall and holds nearly the entire order book for that model. Whether those handovers stay on track is unclear. Alaska is slated as the launch customer for the larger Max 10. The FAA review could slow Max 10 certification and delay Max 7 deliveries that only recently cleared the agency.
An airline source put the crew-workload problem in plain terms.
The source asked:
"How busy do you want your crew to be?"
And added:
"Are you introducing distractions at the worst possible moment?"
That is the practical test. A go-around already demands fast, precise work close to the ground. Adding unexpected mode changes is exactly the kind of cockpit clutter carriers say they will not accept on new jets.
Boeing first learned of the issue from an airline in November 2024. In February 2025 the company reviewed it and decided it was not a safety issue. After more operator information came in, Boeing stood up a formal safety review board. The board’s findings went to the FAA this month.
Last month Boeing sent a bulletin to all 737 operators. A company spokesperson said the firm told carriers about “a software issue where pilots may not have access to automated flight guidance during a specific landing scenario,” reinforced existing procedures for handling it, and said engineers are building a permanent software fix.
The same bulletin pointed to a software fix “sometime in 2028,” with updated pilot guidance planned for November. Boeing says it is working to speed both up. Versions 14 and 14.1 of the flight-management operating system are the ones implicated. The Max 7 was certified with version 14. The Max 10 has been flying certification tests on 14.1.
The Wall Street Journal first reported the glitch. CBS followed with the airline pushback and the FAA’s next steps.
The FAA said it knows about “a potential issue in a software update for the flight computers on certain Boeing 737 MAX airplanes” and is working with Boeing and the airlines. The agency will convene a Corrective Action Review Board and “will take immediate action if it identifies a safety concern.”
That is the regulatory floor. It is not the same as a cleared airplane. Carriers are treating the bulletin as a trust-but-verify moment, not a clean bill of health.
Allegiant Air also flies the Max. CBS reached out; no comment was reported.
Two Max crashes in 2018 and 2019 killed 346 people and were tied to defective software. In January 2024 an Alaska Airlines Max suffered a mid-flight door-plug blowout blamed on manufacturing mistakes. Those episodes are why airlines now flinch at any new flight-computer surprise, even one Boeing labels non-urgent.
The Max remains central to Boeing’s recovery. New variants and steady deliveries are the cash flow the company needs. A software problem that stalls Max 7 handovers or Max 10 certification hits that plan directly. Airlines refusing the affected operating system make the pressure concrete: they would rather hold the older load than accept a known mode drop on a go-around.
No injuries, damage, or accident has been tied to this specific VNAV disengage in the reporting. The risk sits in the scenario itself, low altitude, high workload, less automation than the crew expected, and in a fix schedule that, on paper, still stretched years out when operators first saw the bulletin.
Boeing says procedures already cover the case and a permanent patch is coming faster than 2028. The FAA has the findings and a review board to run. Southwest, United, and their peers have already voted with their delivery docks. After the last decade of Max failures, that is the only leverage that has consistently forced the issue into the open.
When airlines refuse the jets and the regulator is still gathering its board, passengers should expect the industry to fix the software before the next round of promises, not years after.
